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JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR THE PUBLIC LANDS:
COMMENT TO ERIC BIBER
SHI-LING HSU
Eric Biber’s contribution to this Environmental Law Without
Courts Symposium is, as he always is, insightful and lucid. His
observations on how judicial review directly and indirectly affect
administrative agency practices get to the crux of why we organized
this symposium at Florida State—understanding those things
that happen inside of administrative agencies and outside of judicial
review. The applicability of this phenomenon to public lands management is especially instructive because of the nature of those
industries that lease federal public lands. As it turns out, the
prospect of judicial review—as well as the lack thereof—casts a long
shadow indeed on the practices of administrative agencies managing federal public lands.
Biber’s article reviews two ways in which case law has
limited the scope and intrusiveness of judicial review: (i) requiring
judicial challenges to address specific agency actions, rather than
broader programmatic ones, and rather than agency inactions, and
(ii) imposing barriers in the form of standing requirements for
plaintiffs. Biber is doubtful that these limits systematically discriminate against environmental organizations as plaintiffs, as there
are a number of structural reasons that better explain the fact that
environmental organizations are more commonly plaintiffs and,
therefore, more frequently losers in litigation. It thus seems more
appropriate to consider, as Biber does, the long-term implications
of the relevant case law and the trends therein. What indeed, as
Biber asks, “is the potential over the next ten to twenty years for the
role of courts vis-à-vis land management agencies to change?”1
The potential is great. It is hard to forecast, as the relationship
between courts and federal land management agencies surely
depends to some extent on political, geopolitical, and ecological
conditions that seem increasingly chaotic these days. While the
judiciary is obviously not an explicitly political body, it would be
naïve to think that, at least from a descriptive point of view, judges
would truly stand by and let Rome burn. The seemingly accelerating
effects of climate change, the election of President Donald Trump,
and the volatile and shifting allegiances among nations all have the
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1. Eric Biber, Looking Toward the Future of Judicial Review for the Public Lands,
32 J. OF LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 359, 360 (2017).
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potential to affect the way that the American judiciary views its role
in an American democracy—if it in fact remains a democracy.
I have two comments on Biber’s contribution, neither of which is
a direct challenge, except insofar as to suggest that his summary of
the case law might be subject to change in a dramatically climatechanged world, an emerging authoritarian dystopia, or a radically
different world order. If anything, I hope Biber, as a leading theoretical and practicing scholar of public land management, would
take these comments as an invitation to take a more normative tone
in his work in this area.
My first comment is that it is troubling that courts have shied
away from review of programmatic agency decisions. One can
readily understand the administrative law tradition of leaving
agencies to freely make the larger, technically difficult policy decisions without the threat of litigation. It also makes more sense
jurisprudentially, as courts should only be adjudicating choate
actions and injuries, not grand plans and vague harms. But it may
be just as important, and perhaps more important, for courts to have
an oversight role because programmatic decisions play a very large
role in shaping broad patterns of capital investment, much more
so than the day-to-day decisions that courts seem more willing to
review. The Northern Great Plains Resources Program2 helped
usher in an era of unprecedented mineral exploitation, one that
continues to reshape the landscape decades after its initiation.
The low sulfur content of this Western coal,3 less environmentally
harmful than that mined in the Midwestern and Appalachian U.S.,
coupled with the Clean Air Act sulfur dioxide emissions trading
program, led to an explosion of mining activity that has reshaped
the economies of the Northern Great Plains states.4 As we all know,
the twilight of this era of coal mining has been brought about not by
regulation or by recognition of the social costs of coal combustion,
but by the emergence of cheap natural gas by hydraulic fracturing,
which has itself become a transformative industry.
There is a certain path-dependence to the development of
fossil fuel industries, which tend to be highly capital-intensive.
Programmatic decisions establish the conditions under which
large amounts of capital are mobilized. Once mobilized, the owners
of this capital yearn to deploy it, repeatedly and broadly. What
was the effect of the Northern Great Plains Resource Program?
2. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ROCKY MOUNTAIN-PRAIRIE REGION, NORTHER GREAT
PLAINS RESOURCES PROGRAM, ACCOMPLISHMENT PLAN (1974).
3. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. COAL RESERVES: AN UPDATE BY
HEAT AND SULFUR CONTENT ix-xi (1993).
4. Daniel J. Daly, Coal, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE GREAT PLAINS, http://plainshumanities.unl.edu/encyclopedia/doc/egp.ind.014 (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
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It was the large-scale development of fossil extraction resources
with massive amounts of capital investment. Conservatively, producing the roughly 400 million tons of coal from the Powder River
Basin5 requires a capital outlay of $5.4 billion as a start-up cost
for a mine that would last about thirty years.6 This kind of money
will not be easily stranded. The stakes for programmatic decisions
are thus much greater than those deemed to be “specific” agency
actions, those more susceptible of judicial challenge.
Why does capital-intensity in fossil fuel industries create
such path-dependency? The answer is a political-economic one.
Expensive capital investments create their own political economies.
Making money extracting fossil fuels is a volume business, dependent upon the freedom to operate expensive pieces of machinery
for extended periods of time to extract amounts of fossil fuel of
low value relative to the machinery. Fossil fuel extraction is only
profitable when it can deploy large amounts of expensive capital for
long periods of time without interruption from pesky regulators.
One obvious answer to my argument is that if there are social
costs or environmental externalities associated with operating this
expensive capital, we have environmental laws, tort laws, and other
public laws that serve to internalize externalities. Private capital
investors run the risk of running afoul of these public laws should
their capital be deemed in the future to impose social costs.
How well has that model of ex post regulation worked out?
Heroically, perhaps, but insufficiently. The reality is, especially
given the political structure that favors Western extraction
interests, that a capital investment in fossil fuel extraction is a
commitment of resources that is irreversible. Politically speaking,
capital investments in fossil fuel extraction are too big to fail.7
What is sorely needed is some sobriety before huge amounts of
private capital are committed to some socially risky venture.

5. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL COAL REPORT 2015
3 tbl.1 (2016), http://www.eia.gov/coal/annual/pdf/acr.pdf.
6. The startup capital cost of a typical 5,000 tonnes/day (about 5,500 tons/day) surface
coal mine is approximately $19 million, exclusive of transportation and processing. InfoMine,
Mining Cost Models, 5,000 Tonne per Day Open Pit Mine Model, COSTMINE, http://costs.infomine.com/costdatacenter/miningcostmodel.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2017). The cost model
assumes a very low stripping ratio, or amount of soil to be removed from above a mined
resource, and it is likely that larger mines would have larger capital costs.
7. See generally Juliet Eilperin, Steven Mufson & Philip Rucker, The oil and gas
industry is quickly amassing power in Trump’s Washington, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-oil-and-gas-industry-is-quickly-amassingpower-in-trumps-washington/2016/12/14/0d4b26e2-c21c-11e6-95780054287507db_story.html?utm_term=.5a0efefcc6c5.
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The “Keep it in the Ground” movement, a push to unilaterally
terminate mineral leasing on federal lands altogether,8 would seem
to be a programmatic decision. But the key difference between
the “Keep it in the Ground” movement and a programmatic decision
to lease is the option value of not leasing. Everyone can see the
ecological irreversibility in leasing: once coal, oil, or gas is extracted,
there is no putting it back. Reabsorption of combusted carbon
dioxide takes place on geologic time scales that are irrelevant to
humankind. By contrast, leaving it in the ground preserves the
option of extraction and combustion at a later date.
But in addition to this irreversibility, we generally overlook
another one that pertains not to extraction, but to the capital
investment. Once a programmatic decision to lease is made, vast
sums of money are spent to extract fossil fuels; invested as they
are in equipment that is very specific to the task of extracting
fossil fuels, this money cannot be unspent. Leaving it in the ground
retains the option value of later investing the money. Going
slowly always seems to be a sensible idea when confronted with
uncertainties. Unfortunately, the scale economy business of fossil
fuel extraction works best not when going slowly, but when
going full bore.
This leads me to my second comment, one that is not addressed
by Biber’s article: the increased importance of National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review and the need for courts to
undertake a more searching review of projects that involve an
“irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources.”9 Again,
irreversibility is considered in ecological terms. In the Bureau
of Land Management’s (BLM) Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) for the Overland Pass Pipeline Project, the BLM writes, on the
subject of irreversible/irretrievable commitments:
An irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources
refers to impacts on or losses to resources that cannot
be recovered or reversed. Examples include permanent
conversion of wetlands, or loss of cultural resources, soils,
wildlife, agricultural, and socioeconomic conditions. The
losses are permanent. Irreversible is a term that describes
the loss of future options. It applies primarily to the effects
of use of nonrenewable resources, such as minerals or
cultural resources, or to those factors, such as soil productivity, that are renewable only over long periods of time. . . .
8.
9.
(1970).

See Biber, supra note 1, at 360 n.5.
National Environmental Policy Act, § 102(C)(v), (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(v)

Spring, 2017]

PUBLIC LANDS COMMENT

379

The monetary investment by Overland Pass is not considered
to be an irreversible or irretrievable commitment of
resources. If this project was not built, the investment
that would have otherwise been spent on these projects
could be spent elsewhere.10
Similarly, the Final Programmatic EIS for the 2012-2017 Outer
Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program provides that “the
consumption of fuels during exploration, construction, production,
and decommissioning would represent an irreversible and irretrievable commitment. The offshore oil and natural gas resources
recovered as a result of the proposed action would be irretrievable
once they are consumed.”11 The Programmatic EIS goes on to state
that biological resources may, of course, also be irreversibly or
irretrievably committed before an EIS, in contravention of NEPA.12
My argument is that this is an insufficient way of looking at
irreversibility. Monetary investments are irreversible to some
extent, just because of the politics of large expenditures of money.
The fiction that large private expenditures are solely the business
of the private investors is the exact reason why economic investments should be a legitimate source of inquiry in reviewing
programmatic decisions under NEPA.
This might seem an odd line of inquiry to take under NEPA,
or for a reviewing court to undertake, since courts don’t typically
engage in economic analysis in reviewing agency decisions. But how
is that different from engaging in the ecological analysis required of
courts under NEPA? Are judges any less expert in economic matters
than they are in ecological ones?
The whole point of NEPA is to be proactive. NEPA requires that
agencies evaluate the cumulative impact of “reasonably foreseeable
future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal)
or person undertakes such other actions,”13 and to include “similar
actions, which when viewed with other reasonably foreseeable or
proposed agency actions, have similarities that provide a basis
10. U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., OVERLAND PASS NATURAL GAS
LIQUIDS PIPELINE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 7-1 (2007) (emphasis added).
11. U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., OUTER CONTINENTAL
SHELF OIL AND GAS LEASING PROGRAM: 2012-2017: FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT 7-1 (2012), https://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Oil_and_Gas_
Energy_Program/Leasing/Five_Year_Program/2012-2017_Five_Year_Program/07_Irreversible.pdf.
12. Id. at 7-2.
13. 42 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2012); Summary of the National Environmental Policy Act, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-national-environmental-policy-act (last visited Apr. 2, 2017) (“NEPA's basic policy is to assure that all
branches of government give proper consideration to the environment prior to undertaking
any major federal action that significantly affects the environment.”).
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for evaluating their environmental consequences together . . . .”14
So why would reviewing agencies not consider the reasonably
foreseeable private capital decisions made by private investors?
Certainly, the behavior of the fossil fuel industries is predictable.
Making some fairly obvious suppositions should not be outside
of the realm of inquiry for agencies, nor for courts.
Legal rules and institutions seem to embody an idea that capital
investment is an unalloyed good. Government policy should take
great pains to avoid interfering with the long-term operation of
capital, lest it discourage investment and unwittingly tamp down
economic activity and growth. If there are any latent or future
negative externalities associated with the operation of that capital,
that is a public law matter; we leave that to the business of environmental law, tort law, or whatever body of law it is that might
address the externality. One thing that agencies can and should do
is undertake a more searching inquiry into some fairly predictable
actions that might be undertaken by private investors in light of
their land use management decisions, even programmatic ones.
To be sure, this would not initially be environmental law “without
courts.” But if the point of this conference is to highlight some
agency practices that might thrive without judicial supervision,
then this is one conceptual step that seems worth contemplating.

14. Id. § 1508.25(a)(3).

